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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON BERLANT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN S. McALLISTER, Admin-
istrator of the Estates of Grant 
Kimball Mower and Altha Mower, 
his wife, deceased, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12076 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
In this action, arising from an automobile colli-
sion, the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defend-
ant for personal injuries and the defendant seeks to 
recover from the plaintiff for wrongful death of two 
persons. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted summary judgment 
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and the defend-
ant's counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the judgment in 
his favor. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts is not accur-
ate. The plaintiff filed the complaint prepared for 
him by J. Rulon Morgan, an attorney, on November 
7, 1968, nearly three years after the accident (R. 1). 
A counterclaim in excess of the amount of the plain-
tiff's liability insurance and in the amount of 
$103,000 was filed for wrongful death by the defend-
ant on January 21, 1969 (R. 12). The counterclaim 
was served on Gordon Berlant at his address in San 
1\lateo, California, and was not served on Farmers 
Insurance Exchange (R. 18). The plaintiff de-
livered the counterclaim to Farmers Insurance 
Exchange (hereinafter called Farmers) and it em-
ployed Don J. Hanson, an attorney, to file a reply to 
the counterclaim. To protect the plaintiff Mr. Han-
son, in his reply to the counterclaim, pled as a defense 
a compromise settlement including a release of all 
claims signed by the defendant in April 1966 (R. 23, 
24). The defense was not limited to the· extent the 
counterclaim was covered by liability insurance is-
sued by Farmers to the plaintiff. 
After the settlement was pled as a reply to the 
counterclaim the defendant moved for summary 
judgment dismissing the complaint. This motion 
was noticed up for hearing on February 12, 1969, (R. 
25, 26) and later the hearing on the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment was continued until 
April 10, 1969, in order to give the plaintiff, a non-
2 
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resident, an opportunity to appear or to arrange for 
legal counsel to appear on his behalf ( R. 36). At the 
hearing on the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on April 10, 1969, Udell R. Jensen, as per-
sonal attorney for Mr. Berlant, appeared along with 
Mr. Edward Garrett, an attorney employed by 
Farmers to represent Mr. Berlant in the action. In 
this hearing the settlement was relied upon as a de-
fense to the counterclaim. In contradiction to what 
appellant says in his brief the appellant relied on the 
settlement and ratified it as a personal defense to 
the counterclaim. During the hearing on April 10, 
1969, Udell R. Jensen, the personal attorney for Mr. 
Berlant, sought and received permission from the 
court to file a memorandum in opposition to defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. The memoran-
dum was filed by Udell R. Jensen, the personal at-
torney for Mr. Berlant, on May 29, 1969 (R. 49). In 
this memorandum Udell R. Jensen ratified the re-
lease and claimed the release unequivocably as a de-
fense. Mr. Jensen said: 
"Upon the basis of the contents of the in-
surance policy, the contents of the court order, 
and the contents of the release, plaintiff main-
tains the release is a bar to the counterclaim ; 
that it may stand as such herein; and is not 
an accord and satisfaction of the claim of the 
plaintiff against the defe~dant. If the pl3;in-
tiff must make any election after becoming 
aware of his situation, he should not be re-
quired at this time to so do." (R. 51, 52). 
On May 5, 1969, the court signed an order giv-
3 
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ing Udell R. Jensen additional time to investigate 
the facts and problems connected with the case (R. 
53). On September 2, 1969, the lower court granted 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment dis-
missing the complaint (R. 71-73). After the lower 
court signed an order on September 2, 1969, grant-
ing defendant's motion, Udell R. Jensen, on Septem-
ber 5, 1969, moved to vacate the September 2, 1969, 
order and to file an amended reply to the counter-
claim. September 5, 1969, was the first time the 
plaintiff did not claim the compromise settlement, 
including the release taken by Farmers, as a defense. 
On March 12, 1970, the lower court granted surn-
n.iary judgment in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action, and dis-
missed the action as to all parties with prejudice de-
nying plaintiff the right to amend his reply (R. 92). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF ELECTED TO AND DID RATIFY 
THE SETTLEMENT MADE BY FARMERS TO PRO-
TECT HIM. 
The plaintiff must accept the burdens that go 
with the release obtained by Farmers as well as the 
benefits the settlement provides. 
In the lower court the defendant did not claim 
the release constituted admission of negligence as a 
matter of law on the part of the plaintiff. In 
this court the defendant does not claim the release 
constitutes an admission of negligence as a matter of 
4 
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law. In presenting Proposition A. under Point I ap-
pellant in his brief has presented to the court an im-
material issue. 
The position of the defendant in the lower court 
and in this court is that the compromise and settle-
ment made by Farmers is a mutual settlement of all 
claims between the plaintiff and the defendant be-
cause the plaintiff, after he learned of the settlement 
and compromise made on his behalf by Farmers, rati-
fied the settlement and compromise by claiming the 
settlement, including the release taken by Farmers, 
as a defense to defendant's counterclaim. 
The evidence is clear that plaintiff elected to 
and did ratify because: 
1. He delivered the counterclaim to Farmers to 
defend. 
2. At the hearing on April 10, 1970, the plain-
tiff claimed the benefit of the settlement, including 
the release. 
3. Again on May 29, 1970, the plaintiff through 
his personal attorney in submitting a memorandum 
to the court, again claimed benefit of the settlement, 
including the release. 
The defendant concedes that if the plaintiff had 
not elected to ratify and set up the release as a de-
fense of the counterclaim, the release would not con-
stitute a proper defense. 
Keith vs. Glenn, 262 N.C. 284, 136 S.E. 2d 665 
5 
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( 1964), is a leading case. In this case the plaintiff 
brought an action to recover for personal injuries 
and property damage. The defendant counter-
claimed seeking to recover for personal injuries and 
property damage sustained in the collision. The 
plaintiff, in reply to the counterclaim, alleged his 
liability insurer had paid defendant $1,250 in full 
settlement of the defendant's claim against the plain-
tiff and that the defendant executed a release 
barring defendant's counterclaim. The court dis-
missed the complaint and counterclaim. The court 
said where the plaintiff elected to plead the receipt of 
$1,250 by the defendant and an execution of the re-
lease by the defendant for the compromise and settle-
ment of the disputed claim, the settlement barred the 
counterclaim and the plaintiff by pleading the re-
lease ratified the insurer's settlement and com-
promise and the parties each had to accept the bur-
dens of the release as well as the benefits of settle-
ment. In response to plaintiff's argument that sound 
legal principles should not be applied in controversies 
between insured motorists, the court said: 
"Plaintiff argues this sound legal princi-
ple should not be applied in controversies 
between insured motorists. He has, he says, 
purchased and paid for insurance which will 
compensate those he may injure. A payment 
by his insurance carrier for injuries he inflicts 
should not impair his right to compensation 
for injuries he sustains. The contention would 
have merit if his insurance provided for pay-
ment irrespective of fault or liability. It does 
6 
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not. It is liability, not accident insurance. 
Plaintiff's insurance carrier was under no ob-
ligation to pay unless plaintiff was legally 
liable. The insurance carrier had the right to 
compromise and settle claims asserted against 
•t . d " i s insure .... 
The cases cited by appellant in his brief are not 
in point. They involve factual situations in which it 
is clear that the insured made no effort to ratify the 
settlement or compromise made by his liability in-
surer. 
In the cases cited by the appellant, in each in-
stance the plaintiff did not have knowledge of the 
settlement made by the insurer and did nothing to 
E'how consent or ratification of the settlement. 
In this case, Berlant, the plaintiff, claimed the 
fruits of the settlement agreement after discovering 
it. Mr. Berlant did not instruct Farmers to with-
draw the release as a defense to the counterclaim. 
He did not instruct Mr. Jensen to move to amend the 
reply and vacate the release as a settlment. Instead, 
Mr. Berlant, through his attorney, Mr. Jensen, and 
through Farmers' attorney, relied on the release as 
a defense to the counterclaim until they were noti-
fied summary judgment was being granted dismis-
sing the action. Mr. Berlant consented to the settle-
ment made by Farmers and ratified it by standing on 
the release as a defense. Mr. Berlant is in the posi-
tion of a principal trying to ratify a part of the 
agreement and repudiate the rest. He cannot take 
the rose without the thorns. 
7 
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POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF'S RATIFICATION OF FARM-
ERS' SETTLEMENT AND COMPROMISE IS IRREVO-
CABLE. 
Since the counterclaim was greatly in excess of 
the plaintiff's liability insurance, it is understand-
ecble that he wanted to rely on the fruits of the 
compromise and settlement agreement. In this in-
stance, Berlant, the plaintiff, did not act timely in 
seeking to revoke the ratification. Instead, he waited 
until the court ruled on the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and then sought to obtain leave 
to amend his pleadings in order to withdraw the 
settlement as a defense. 
White vs. Perry, 7 N.C. App. 36, 171 S.E. 2d 56 
( 1969), involved a factual situation similar to the 
case of Mr. Berlant. In the White case the plaintiff 
endeavored to withdraw a reply to avoid having it 
constitute a ratification of plaintiff's liability insur-
er's settlement. In White vs. Perry, supra, an action 
was brought by the plaintiff for personal injuries 
and property damage and a counterclaim was as-
serted by the defendant. In reply to the counterclaim 
the plaintiff asserted a release was obtained by his 
liability insurer from the defendant. Thereafter, ap-
parently to avoid ratification of his liability insurer's 
settlement the plaintiff obtained an order from the 
court and withdrew the reply setting up the release 
as a defense. After an amended answer was filed 
the defendant again pled the release to be a bar to 
the plainiff's claim. The lower court granted judg-
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.... 
ment in favor of the defendant holding the release 
to bar plaintiff's claim. On appeal the court of ap-
peals said: 
"This leaves us with the proposition of 
whether the withdrawal by the plaintiff of the 
further reply constituted a revocation of the 
ratification. The answer is no. In Norwood 
vs. Lassiter, 132 N.C. 52, 43 S.E. 2d 509, it is 
said: 'When a party has the right to ratify or 
reject, he is put thereby to his election, and he 
must decide once and for all, what to do; and 
when his election is once made it immediately 
becomes irrevocable. This is an elementary 
principle. Austin vs. Stewart, 126 N.C. 525, 
36 S.E. 2d 37.' See also Breckenridge, Ratifi-
cation in North Carolina, 18 N.C. L. Review 
308. Although the further reply has been 
withdrawn as a pleading, it was proper for 
Judge Bundy to consider it in making his 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Davis 
vs. Morgan, 228 N.C. 8, 44 S.E. 2d 593 
(1947). 
Utah requires a principal to accept the entire 
contract negotiated by an agent and does not permit 
the principal to accept that portion only that he 
deems beneficial. In Moses vs. Archie McFarland & 
Son, 119 Utah 602, 230 P. 2d 571 (1951), an agent 
for Archie McFarland & Son purportedly, without 
authority, entered into a contract to deliver 30,000 
pounds of mutton at the rate of 3,000 pounds or more 
per week as agreed to by the plaintiff. The defend-
ant, after shipping approximately 6,625 pounds of a 
30,000 pound order, tried to disaffirm its agent's or-
der. In deciding the case in favor of the purchaser 
9 
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Moses this court said it was too late for Archie Mc-
Farland & Son to repudiate the agreement after 
making the first shipment. Further the court said 
that where an agent has entered into a contract with-
out authority and purportedly on behalf of his princi-
pal, the principal cannot confirm such part of the 
contract as is beneficial to him and reject the part 
which is claimed to be detrimental. 
If Berlant did not want to accept the detriment 
of having the release obtained by Farmers bar his 
claim against McAllister, he should not have claimed 
the benefit of it to bar McAllister's counterclaim un-
til the lower court ruled on McAllister's motion for 
summary judgment. If the plaintiff, Berlant, did not 
want to be bound by Farmer's agreement, he should 
have repudiated the release agreement promptly and 
should not have elected to stand on it until he knew 
the court's ruling on the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
In Grandi vs. LeSage, 7 4 N.M. 799, 399 
P. 2d 285 (1965), a horse trainer as an agent 
employed by the seller registered a horse as a chest-
nut colt indicating it to be a stallion. In fact the horse 
was a gelding and after the buyer clarned it upon the 
official program showing it as a stallion the buyer 
demanded his money back upon discovering immedi-
ately the misrepresentaton. In deciding the case the 
court said that upon acquiring knowledge of an 
agent's unauthorized act the principal should proper-
ly repudiate it or otherwise he will be presumed to 
10 
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have ratified it and affirmed it. This court also said 
that when a principal expressly or impliedly elects to 
ratify an unauthorized act he must so far as it is en-
tire, ratify the whole of it, and he will not be per-
mitted to accept its benefits and reject its burdens. 
Ratification is equivalent to an original grant 
of authority. Presumably, Berlant ratified the 
settlement when he did not immediately repudiate 
iL Clearly, between April 1969 and September 2, 
1969, he did nothing to reject it. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS REPLY. 
The lower court awarded summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant dismissing the plaintiff's 
cause of action on September 2, 1969. The plaintiff's 
motion to amend the reply was not filed until Sep-
tember 5, 1969, or three days after the order was 
entered dismissing the plaintiff's action. Farmers, 
plainiff's insurer, paid only $5,150 for the deaths of 
two persons. The plaintiff stood on the release ob-
tained by Farmers as a defense to the counterclaim. 
Udell R. Jensen, the personal attorney for Berlant, 
told the lower court they should have the benefit of 
the release. He did not repudiate it between April 
1969, and September 2, 1969, the date the court 
ruled. 
In Goeltz vs. The Continental Bank & Trust 
Co., 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P. 2d 832 (1956), an action 
11 
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was brought against the bank to recover stock cer-
tificates delivered by the plaintiff to the bank. The 
plaintiff's former husband had forged plaintiff's en-
dorsement on the certificates as security for a loan. 
During the trial the bank asked leave to amend its 
answer and set up the defense of the statute of 
limitations. The trial court refused to allow the 
amendment. In this case, facts upon which the sta-
tute of limitations defense was based were known 
to the bank prior to the bringing of the action. The 
court said that under Rule 15 (a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides that leave to amend 
shall be freely given when justice requires, the bank 
was not entitled to amend. The court said the bank 
was willing to waive the defense of the statute of 
limitations in the beginning and since the facts up-
on which the statute of limitations defense were 
known from the start to the bank there was no abuse 
of discretion in failing to permit the bank at trial to 
amend and plead the statute of limitations. 
In Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. vs. Nephi 
Processing Plant, Inc. 470 P. 2d 257 (Utah 1970) a 
defendant moved to file an amended answer to be 
presented and this court held the amended answer 
was properly refused, saying that the motion to 
amend should have been pursued in advance of trial, 
not at the trial. 
In another case, Summerhays vs. Holm 468 P. 
2d 366 (Utah 1970), this court stated a controvert-
12 
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ing affidavit proffered at trial on a motion for sum-
mary judgment was not timely and without merit as 
a defense. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS A VALID ACCORD AND SATISFAC-
TION. 
An accord and satisfaction is the giving of 
money paid over in payment or extinguishment of a 
claim. To constitute an accord and satisfaction there 
must be a proper subject matter, competent parties 
and the assent or meeting of the minds of parties and 
a consideration. An accord is an agreement beween 
parties, one to give or perform, the other to receive 
or accept, such agreed payment or performance in 
satisfaction of a claim and the satisfaction is a con-
summation of such agreement. 
Farmers' payment to Mr. McAllister consum-
ated an accord and satisfaction. Utah recognizes 
this principle. In Badger & Co. vs. Fidelity Building 
& Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P. 2d 669 
( 1938), this court said that where the parties are in 
disagreement and, in good faith, thereafter reach 
a compromise settlement of the unliquidated and dis-
puted claim, the settlement constitutes an accord 
and satisfaction. 
The settlement between Farmers and the de-
fendant McAllister in April, 1966, constituted an 
accord and satisfaction. The plaintiff, when he 
adopted the benefits of the settlement as a defense 
to the counterclaim ratified the accord and satisfac-
13 
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tion and was bound by the detriments in it as well as 
the benefits it gave him. The plaintiff takes the ac-
cord and satisfaction in its entirety, the thorns go 
with the rose. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ant should be affirmed because: 
1. There is a valid accord and satisfaction. 
2. The plaintiff elected to and did ratify the 
compromise and settlement made by Farmers. 
3. The plaintiff did not repudiate or reject the 
compromise settlement timely after discovering it. 
4. The lower court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to permit the plaintiff to amend his re· 
ply to revoke the ratification after making its ruling. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Raymond M. Berry 
'VORSLEY, SNO'V & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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MAILING NOTICE 
I hereby certify by United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief 
to Nielsen, Conder, Hansen & Henriod 410 Newhouse 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, two copies to 
Udell R. Jensen, 125 North Main Street, Nephi, 
Utah 84648, and two copies to Hanson and Garrett, 
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Raymond M. Berry 
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